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“If we had anything of our own worth speaking about, it was an awareness of the community’s rights 
and the place of the individual in it”  
Fisherman elder of the Temple Committee that once decided matters about sea tenure, gear restrictions and seasonal 
closures among other things. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The need, as well as the urge, to move towards a sustainable and socially beneficial utilisation of 
fishery resources is now being felt world-wide. In the developing countries, and more particularly in 
the populous Asia-Pacific tropics, fishery resources constitute a major component of the real natural 
wealth of these nations. Long before the conception of the nation state, getting the most from this 
gift of nature for the greatest social good was always a priority in this part of the world. Coastal 
communities in this region have over the centuries evolved a variety of forms of collective 
relationships between fishery resources and themselves. These had served two ends. First, they 
helped the coastal communities to establish “rights” relationships with other communities who 
acknowledged their claims to the fishery resources. Second, it provided them the basis for a convivial 
life for themselves. 
I contend in this paper that both these aspects have foundered as a result of the erosion of the 
property rights held by these coastal communities. This has been primarily a consequence of the 
enthusiasm of the nation state to “develop” these communities using the development paradigm of 
the West. A revival of the initial conditions, is neither totally feasible nor conducive. But equally 
inappropriate are the current efforts to mobilise opinion for consideration of individual private 
property rights to fishery resources. They are being touted as the panacea for setting out on the 
voyage towards sustainable coastal fisheries development and management. 
In this paper I attempt to question this approach and urge for a re-discovery and re-establishment of 
the fundamental foundations of what we call a “community property right” in fisheries. Examining the 
steps being made in the maritime State of Kerala, India, to strive towards this goal provides a case 
study to examine the feasibility of the approach. 
2. UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Property rights are the sanctioned relationships between human beings in their utilisation of 
resources. They provide a good example of an institution which Douglas North (1990) defines as 
“humanly devised constraints that shape interactions” and provide “a structure to everyday life”. 
Human beings interact with natural resources and the environment through a variety of property 
rights that are embedded in particular ecological, social, political, cultural and economic contexts. The 
primary economic function of property rights, in the words of Demsetz (1967), “is that of guiding 
incentives to achieve a greater internalisation of externalities”. In this process, management and 
governance of the resource attain direction and purpose. 
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By property I refer not to the thing, or object of our interest, (in this case the sea or fishery resources) 
but primarily to a secure claim to a future stream of benefits arising from it. By rights I imply the 
capacity of the claimants to the property to call upon “the others” without such claims, to 
acknowledge their duty to honour the claim. Such duty may be incorporated in written law or 
unwritten custom. One can therefore envision a property right regime to be composed of a triadic 
relationship involving (a) the benefit stream from the resource, (b) the claimant with rights and (c), 
the others who dutifully honour the rights of the claimants. Over time, socially sanctioned mechanisms 
- rules, regulations, norms, laws - gradually surround the triad to ensure the sustenance of the 
relationships. What needs to be stressed again is that property rights have more to do with 
relationships between people than claims over things or resources. There is no need for material proof 
of this (i.e. documents). It can be a social contract based on custom and trust. However, if this triad 
cannot be completed - usually because of the lack of “the other” - we then have a situation of “open-
access”. In an open-access regime there exists only privilege of access and possession but no property 
rights. 
Basically therefore, one can talk about a spectrum of property right regimes for fishery resources: a 
“no property right” (NPR), or open-access regime, with only the privilege of possession; a state 
property right (SPR) regime; a private property right (PPR) regime and a common property right (CPR) 
regime. State property and private property right regimes are well defined and need no further 
elaboration here. These are the regimes with the greatest social sanction and accompanied by the 
most elaborate legal framework that specifies the rights and duties of each regime. There is little 
confusion about what they entail. However, in the oft-quoted popular literature on fishery resource 
management, the greatest source of confusion is with regard to the lack of distinction between the 
common property right regimes and open-access or no property-right regimes. Take for example the 
world-famous piece by biologist Garret Hardin (1968) entitled “Tragedy of the Commons,” which is so 
often quoted in fisheries literature. It should rightly have been titled “Tragedy of Open Access” since 
the triadic structure of relationships necessary to establish property rights did not exist in the pasture 
described by him. Common property is basically private property of a group of co-owners who have 
both rights and duties with respect to the use rates and the management of the resource claimed by 
them. Baland and Platteau (1996) highlight a useful distinction between an unregulated common 
property right regime which tends towards open-access and a regulated common property right 
regime, which is akin to the private property of a group of co-owners. 
3. DEFINING COMMUNITY PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The issue of property rights over natural resources is of particular importance in Third World countries 
where many millions of people, often organised in small, location-specific and occupation-specific 
communities, depend directly on natural resources for their day-to-day survival. Such communities 
have been referred to by Dasmann (1988) as “ecosystem people/communities” highlighting their close 
relationship with nature and a deep socially embedded “connectedness” to it. This makes it necessary 
to view these communities differently. They are to be seen not merely as individuals who form groups, 
but as groups of people who, through discrete and evolving interactions, have formed exclusive and 
overlapping linkages, both within themselves and between themselves and other groups, to form 
larger “communities”. Indeed, many nation states in the Asia-Pacific tropics can also be viewed as the 
grouping-together of such communities within certain defined geographic borders. 
In this paper I wish to introduce the concept of a community property right (COPR) regime (see Kurien 
1998a). One approach could be to treat this as a special case of the common property right regime. 
However, I follow a different tack. The reason for doing so is twofold: 
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i. There is a need to shift from viewing individuals working together as individuals to viewing 
individuals working together as a group. The latter work together in a context where their actions and 
choices are contextualised in the natural societal milieu to which they belong by virtue of inter-
generational occupational and associational or geographic identity. They stay together because of a 
network of mutual obligations, responsibilities and duties. 
ii. I wish to distinguish property which is merely claimed by a group, from property that has been in 
history and tradition held in trusteeship and stewardship by a group, which has related to it for their 
survival and livelihood and through this interaction has evolved advantageously into a coherent 
“ecosystem community”. 
Such a community property right in coastal fisheries by definition requires co-owners to engage in 
consultation and participation to seek common approval of certain actions that they may thereafter 
mutually agree to undertake individually. These would include, among other things, decisions on the 
nature and the quantum of capital to be invested in the harvesting activity in a particular area; the 
norms regarding the extent and the timing of the effort to be expended in this activity; and the manner 
in which the output is to be disposed of. Consequently, a community property right does not usurp 
the crucial role played by individuals. It only circumscribes it within the confines of collective norms. 
There is nothing unusual about this in ecosystem communities of the Asia-Pacific tropics. Since the 
basic motivation is pursuit of a good and decent livelihood the participants tend to have a longer time-
horizon as regards their relationship to the resource and a keener ecosystem-perspective towards it. 
Given the highly complex nature of fishery resources in the tropics, this combination of individual 
enterprise, under a rubric of community norms, helps to take advantage of the skill variations (innate 
human capital differences) among fishermen. It also acts as a great motivator of benign competition 
in coastal fishing. Yet it keeps in check the ills of unbridled freedom, which lead to excessive “capital 
stuffing” (the bane of even the ITQ systems which assign PPRs to fishermen). This certainly puts a cap 
on excessive private accumulation possibilities. However, the benefits in terms of equity of 
opportunity, and freedom to modulate effort in keeping with the highly diverse fishery resource in 
tropical waters, result in optimising the social accumulation of wealth from the coastal fishery. 
4. EXISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL COMMUNITY PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Social scientists who have studied ecosystem communities in coastal fisheries in the Asia-Pacific 
tropics will wholeheartedly endorse the existence of traditional community rights among them in a 
variety of forms. The recent compendium of Ruddle (1994) is most useful in this regard. It provides a 
broad-brush treatment of the evidence of rights in traditional community-based systems of fishery 
management from 21 countries varying in size and complexity from sub-continental India to the 
islands of Kiribati. Even this effort highlights how little we yet know about the institutional 
arrangements and the structure of rights as perceived, defined, delimited and defended by small-scale 
fishing communities of the region. The moot point, therefore, is that the triad of rights existed. Fishing 
communities made claims over coastal resources and the rest of society honoured these claims. There 
is therefore no need to produce written records as proof to establish their effective operation. 
Moreover, the earlier meticulous analysis of scholars like Johannes (1978) leave little doubt that all 
the resource rights and management measures propagated in the West today have nearly all existed 
in the Asia-Pacific tropics long before they were conceived in the temperate water fisheries. 
It is my understanding that the basic foundation of these traditional community property rights 
focussed on four aspects: 
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i. ecological processes, which relate to the stock of fishery resources in the context of the wider ocean 
ecosystem and the means of accumulating and sharing information on this 
ii. institutional and deterrent measures to ensure compliance with community regulations and 
protection of the resource against intruders 
iii. arrangements for sharing and redistribution measures to ensure that none of the members are 
driven to a state of deprivation, which would motivate them to over-exploit the resource 
iv. arrangements for sharing and redistribution measures to ensure that more of the members are 
driven to a state of deprivation that would motivate them to over-exploit the resource. 
We need to draw special attention to the implicit entitlements that individual participants enjoyed in 
a COPR. These help to compensate for the inadequately functioning markets in credit, social security, 
insurance and employment. These entitlements in turn were at the basis of a complex set of rights 
and duties that fostered long-term personal relationships of trust between members of the group. 
This was the basis of moral norms that prevented free-riding and linked individuals together in a bond 
of assurance and cooperation. These factors, in fact, enhanced efficiency within the operation of these 
rights. 
5. HOW TRADITIONAL COMMUNITY PROPERTY RIGHTS GOT ERODED 
The post-World War II intervention of the nation state in bringing about fisheries development 
through the aegis of technological change and market expansion created a situation where these 
community rights to resources became highly insecure. The first casualty of this was the destruction 
of the informal mechanisms of co-operation and trust. These were further jeopardized when the 
traditional regulatory norms surrounding the COPRs were undermined and the social prestige of those 
who enforced them was belittled. This created an institutional vacuum. Into this entered a flood of 
new private (business) interests with an eye for making profits from the resource flows. 
In the coastal fisheries of most developing Asian countries these community property rights were 
replaced, not by any form of State-regulated common property rights, but rather by a de 
facto unregulated common property context - an open-access or no property-rights (NPR) situation. 
Such an open-access resource, linked to a global market with unsatiable demands for the protein of 
the sea, created the ideal menu for resource depletion and ecosystem degradation. Undoubtedly this 
process was hastened by liberal State subsidies to promote capital intensive and environmentally 
over-efficient harvesting technologies that were inappropriate to the resource configuration of the 
tropical waters. [For an excellent case study in the Indian context of the gamut of issues raised here 
see Bavinck (in press)]. 
6. WHY PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE INAPPROPRIATE 
It is against this backdrop that the present global propagation of private rights in fisheries needs to be 
viewed. First, it is being propagated in a manner that gives the mistaken impression that the concept 
of rights to the sea and its resource is alien to developing societies. Second, as with the earlier 
attempts at technology transfer in fisheries, individual PPRs are being promoted without reference to 
the history or current practice on these matters in the developing nations. 
The global advocates of the individual Private Property Rights (PPR) claim to be promoting that 
arrangement in the light of what they observe to be the weaknesses of Common Property Rights (CPR). 
This is a false comparison. What they are really comparing is the idealised, textbook version of PPR 
with the anarchy which prevails in a No Property Rights (NPR) situation. Not only is this position 
7 
 
scientifically illegitimate, it is also doing gross disservice by giving a bad name to the numerous 
elaborate traditional rights arrangements which existed in coastal fisheries in Asia and Pacific that 
were by no stretch of imagination NPR situations. Moreover, the efforts to propagate PPRs in fisheries 
have certain unstated assumptions that are difficult to obtain in the ‘real world’ of either developed 
or developing countries. These include inter alia an unambiguous definition of PPRs; the existence of 
perfect and competitive conditions for all markets; and no costs for enforcement of the PPR. Added 
to this there are certain context-specific factors about the countries where PPRs in fisheries have been 
implemented, which are not present in the developing countries and also unlikely to ever be obtained 
in the near future (see Appendix 1). These objective factors, though they are never explicitly 
mentioned, become barriers to the moves for implementation of PPRs in the developing world in 
general and the Asia-Pacific tropics in particular. These moves are therefore motivated more by blind 
ideological convictions and less by their being socio-economically and technically appropriate to the 
fishery context. 
7. REDISCOVERING COMMUNITY PROPERTY RIGHTS 
In many developing countries in the Asia-Pacific tropics, the crisis of fishery resource degradation and 
depletion has been creating social upheavals that make the administrative and political authorities 
anxious for long-term solutions. This is also coupled with a few important considerations and 
conclusions reached over the last five decades of conventional fisheries development and 
management. 
i. Fishing communities still continue to be among the economically weaker sections in most of these 
countries. Despite this, many of them represent culturally, ethnically or socially strategic segments of 
the society. Discontent among them, if ignored, can be politically inexpedient. 
ii. The earlier “large-scale technology fix” approach to fisheries development cannot proceed much 
further. The physically separated and dispersed nature of the productive coastal waters (e.g. India, 
Indonesia, Philippines, etc.) combined with the innate characteristics of tropical fish species make 
large-scale, centralised harvesting inappropriate and uneconomical. 
iii. There is a growing realisation that fostering sustainable development of the small-scale fishery - 
which is still the backbone of the fish economy - lies in first defining clearly the distributional objectives 
which are sought. Thereafter the technology and organisational structures can be tuned in accord with 
that requirement. 
iv. For economic and socio-cultural considerations the importance of maintaining a viable, 
decentralised settlement pattern has been accorded a priority to prevent large-scale migration of 
fisher-people to urban settlements. This is also in keeping with the growing socio-political pressure 
for decentralisation of governance. 
v. There is an unresolved dilemma between, on the one hand, promoting coastal fisheries as a major 
foreign exchange earner, and on the other, stressing its role as a provider of inexpensive fish for avid 
domestic consumers. 
vi. In the context of globalisation, the inevitability and usefulness of markets has been acknowledged. 
However, the unbridled functioning of markets has been perceived to be inimical to the long-term 
interests of resource conservation. 
vii. The centralised law-and-order approach to fisheries management, which has been tried in many 
big and small countries in the region, has reached its limit. It has proved inappropriate and expensive. 
8 
 
The need to evolve cost-effective, and more stakeholder-participative monitoring and enforcement 
machinery, merits priority of action. 
viii. There is a last opportunity for revival of the scaffolding of numerous community institutional 
arrangements which remain embedded as social capital in the fishing communities. 
These perspectives taken together, point unequivocally to the need for a major structural change in 
the fishing economies of these countries. The need of the hour is for an institutional transition that 
will restore the primacy of property rights to coastal fishery resources giving central place to those 
who depend on it as their main means of livelihood. I therefore argue that a secure future for small-
scale fishing communities in the Asia-Pacific tropics will require a re-discovery and a re-establishment 
of community property rights to coastal fisheries. The foundations will remain the same as those of 
the traditional community property rights mentioned earlier. The superstructure will necessarily have 
to be modified to take the new socio-economic and political realities into consideration. This 
superstructure will not emerge autonomously. It must be consciously crafted in the context of a triadic 
network where the community is the anchor that provides stability, the market acts as an oar to 
provide momentum and the State is the rudder to give direction (see Kurien 1998b). How this is being 
attempted in Kerala State, India is illustrated below. 
8. KERALA STATE: SHOWING THE WAY 
8.1 Antecedents 
Kerala State in South India has a coastline of 600 km along the Arabian Sea. It is home to an 800 000-
strong fishing community scattered across 220 coastal villages. Out of them 170 000 are active 
fishermen netting annually about 600 000t of fish. Kerala has been a pioneer in many aspects of 
fisheries development and management in India. Today, Kerala is making the first strides in moving 
towards community property rights for coastal resources. This realisation, however, comes after over 
four decades of the “business as usual” approach to fisheries development and management. This 
included, inter alia, an international fisheries aid project; transfer of temperate-water harvesting 
technologies with liberal subsidies in the name of making fishing more “efficient”; linking up with the 
export market; State-initiated cooperatives; and zoning regulations. This piece-meal approach did not 
lead to either sustainable management of the fishery resources or to enhanced socio-economic 
welfare of the fishing communities. 
Kerala needs to regain its prominence on the fishery map of India. The need to define rights and do 
this in the context of a community-market-state framework is the ethos of the moment. This has the 
enthusiastic support of the unions and associations of the small-scale fishworkers, NGOs, community 
leaders, the planners and many political parties. 
8.2 Community 
The participants of the small-scale fishery in Kerala have always been rooted in the community. The 
autonomy of the individual and the household or family are circumscribed by the welter of both 
traditions (history) and aspirations (future) provided by the community. Based on the hierarchy of the 
caste-system, their occupation puts them very much at the bottom of the social ladder. In the past 
this was the main cementing force. It has acted as a barrier for entry of other people and capital into 
the fishery. These initial conditions have changed rapidly. Improved technology, and enhanced market 
demand and the State created open access to the fishery which has broken this isolation. Clearly, the 
new community cannot be defined along the lines of caste and creed, which have been the major 
criteria of the past. The consensus is that change can be brought about with an ‘aquarian’ reform. 
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Community property rights should devolve to the local-level community that resides in a defined 
coastal settlement. Its core should consist of all who, irrespective of caste or creed, are willing to 
labour at sea - working owners and workers. It is this new core group that will provide the anchoring 
role for the community. 
At an operational level these community property rights in Kerala should be organised at the level of 
the lowest constitutionally-valid administrative unit of governance. This is at the village level and is a 
feature common to many Asia-Pacific nations. In Kerala it is called the panchayat. The organisational 
concept of the panchayat “Matsya Bhavan” (Fish House) will bring together under one roof the 
various arms of the State that deal with fisheries and fishworkers issues. To start with, in 
each panchayat, the seaward littoral zone contiguous to the land boundary out to a distance of 2km, 
will be community property. This necklace-like structure of community regimes along the coast will 
be coordinated at the larger level of the district panchayat which is ‘coterminous’ to a larger natural 
ecosystem and therefrom to the level of the State (Government of Kerala 1997) 
8.3 Market 
Markets are not new institutions for small-scale fishing communities in Kerala, or for that matter 
anywhere; in fact between State and markets, it is the role of the State that is newer in these 
communities. Exchange, and consequently the compulsions of the market, enter into small-scale 
fishing communities even at a low level of development of the productive forces. In Kerala State, there 
has been, and continues to be, a vibrant domestic market for all species of fish and a strong export 
market for some selected varieties. The market is like a paddle providing momentum to the economy. 
Initially, the market facilitates the expansion of economic opportunities for the community as a whole. 
However, with the emergence of the specialised role of the trader and the development of a buyers’ 
market, the leverage of the producer is greatly diminished. A credit market develops and its 
consequent interlocking with the output-market results in greater dependency on intermediaries. In 
the context of Kerala State, it was the opening of the post-World War II export markets (USA, Japan 
and Europe), which provided the motive force for excessive exploitation of the open-access fishery. 
Market forces, therefore, can never be wished away in the development of any form of property rights 
in a fishery. The issue is, the extent to which market forces will be permitted free play. 
8.4 State 
Proponents of private property rights in fisheries tend to picture the State in a bad light. Our vision 
here is of a State that invigorates rather than steam-rolls; a State that bolsters capability rather than 
stifles initiative; a State that defines the broad contours of economic action rather than strait-jacket 
it. The transition of the coastal waters from an open-access realm to one of community property rights 
can materialise only if the State plays the role of rudder, giving direction for the voyage into the future. 
The legislative support for aquarian reforms fall within this purview. As a first component legislation 
is being drafted permitting ownership of coastal fishing crafts only to those willing to work at sea. This 
measure will ensure limited entry of sorts. It will remove the phenomenon of absentee capitalists (this 
is the bane of small-scale fisheries in many other countries too). The result will be an immediate 
reduction in excess capacity. 
The second component of the aquarian reform package gives the State a regulatory role to ensure 
that markets are modulated to become friendly to communities rather than vice versa. There is the 
proposed legislation to give the right of deciding the mode and the floor-price of the first sales 
transaction of fish to the members of the fishing community. This is an all-important measure to de-
link the output market from its most exploitative link with the credit market. This is the only way that 
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the enhanced physical productivity gains from establishing community property rights will translate 
into tangible economic gains. It will also be a good insurance against “collective overfishing”. 
A third measure is the desirability of greater social control over the export of fish and fishery products. 
This will be an important step to ensure that resources within the community property regime are not 
subjected to excessive market pressure from investors in the export processing sector. 
Another important function of the State will lie in coordination of community rights, their monitoring 
and enforcement. This will be arranged by a co-management contract between State machinery and 
the district panchayats. This will be an attempt to institutionalise cooperation between State and 
user-community by using their comparative strengths at different levels in a complementary way. 
8.5 Barriers to implementation 
The barriers to implementation of community property rights and co-management of the fishery 
resources will be numerous. Trying to alter the status quo of open-access is always difficult because 
of the vested interest of the stakeholders. In Kerala, the opposition to change will come from several 
quarters. Prime among them will be the non-working owners of fishing boats (mainly the fleet of small 
shrimp-trawlers) and the big shrimp-export firms since they have been the main beneficiaries of the 
four decades of State-initiated open-access to the coastal waters. Then come merchants. Any attempt 
to tamper with their hitherto-unchallenged rights to set prices and regulate their unbridled freedom 
to exercise non-price control over fishworkers rarely go unopposed. Firms that have benefited from 
the unregulated demand for boats, engines and nets will resent the curtailment of their business. 
Political parties used to distributing largesse to the fishery sector will support this restricted access 
proposal only if they are convinced that the costs of not doing so outweigh the benefits of the status 
quo. The Department of Fisheries officials are likely to be unenthusiastic about the proposal at the 
outset because decentralisation will imply more work for them at the beginning. Fishery scientists will 
feel challenged by the decentralised community rights since it will call for more accuracy in their work 
and greater risk of being proven to be wrong. In the ultimate analysis, the struggle against such 
opposition and initial lack of support can be overcome only by the firm resolve of the fishworkers to 
stand united in the face of it. In this mission they have support from empathetic social activists and a 
progressive group of political parties in power. 
9. CONCLUSION 
Re-establishing property rights over coastal fishery resources is the most important need of the hour 
to ensure a secure future for small-scale fishing communities in the Asia-Pacific tropics. In many 
countries in this region, small-scale fishing communities have asserted their claims regarding this. On 
balance, a review of over two decades of these initiatives indicates that the response to these moves, 
from the State and other stake-holders in the fishery, have been mixed. Happily, there is a growing 
recognition and greater appreciation of the close interaction between rights to a resource and its 
successful management and governance. In many countries the positive experiences from agriculture 
and forestry are spilling over into the fishery. This will provide an important impetus for coming to 
terms with the assertions and aspirations of small-scale fishworkers on this matter. For the numerous 
reasons enumerated in this paper the attempt to propagate the appropriateness of private property 
rights in forms such as individual transferable quotas needs to be viewed with considerable 
circumspection. The death-knell for open-access to coastal fisheries needs to be rung. A robust 
framework of community property rights must occupy its place. These are more appropriate to the 
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Characteristic features in developed countries where  
private property rights in fisheries have been implemented 
(Note that these are not applicable in the context of developing countries in the Asia-Pacific Tropics) 
 
· Westerners had totally colonised these large resource-rich countries/continents (e.g. Australia, 
Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, USA, Iceland) more often than not trampling over the values and 
property right regimes of the existing indigenous communities (all the above except Iceland) with 
respect to the sea and its resources The coastal fisheries were then turned into an open-access 
realm. 
· The threats of stock collapse are real and have been experienced in recent history 
· Democratic traditions exist and the institutional arrangements of formal market economy are well 
established 
· The economy is labour-scarce and capital-abundant 
· The overall levels of economic development are high 
· The levels of social development (literacy, basic quality of life, social security measures, etc) are 
high and widespread and those engaged in fisheries are not a deprived section of the society. 
· The numbers of persons involved in the fishery are relatively small - usually in the 100s, on 
occasions in the 1000s and very rarely in the 10,000s 
· The preoccupation is with restricting the overall entry of capital and labour without giving any 
consideration for priority rights to those who actually labour at sea. 
· Single-species fishery is possible and the biological information on the resource is well 
communicated to government and industry, and such research and information is an essential input 
in the political decision-making process of management 
· The need to maintain a decentralised settlement pattern is not a socio-economic or political 
compulsion, but centralisation is seen to be advantageous. 
· The organisational arrangements for basic, proper and honest monitoring of fish landings and the 
governance structures for this exist. 
· The adverse interlocking of factor markets is non-existent; investment funds and credit are easily 
available. 
· The choice of fish-export versus domestic-consumption is not a major concern for the internal 
food-security of the country. 
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